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Abstract
The successful use of Bacillus anthracis as a lethal biological weapon has prompted renewed research
interest in the development of more effective vaccines against anthrax. The disease consists of
three critical components: spore, bacillus, and toxin, elimination of any of which confers at least
partial protection against anthrax. Current remedies rely on postexposure antibiotics to eliminate
bacilli and pre- and postexposure vaccination to target primarily toxins. Vaccines effective against
toxin have been licensed for human use, but need improvement. Vaccines against bacilli have
recently been developed by us and others. Whether effective vaccines will be developed against
spores is still an open question. An ideal vaccine would confer simultaneous protection against
spores, bacilli, and toxins. One step towards this goal is our dually active vaccine, designed to
destroy both bacilli and toxin. Existing and potential strategies towards potent and effective anthrax
vaccines are discussed in this review.
Anthrax as a biological weapon
Bacillus anthracis, the etiologic agent of anthrax, is an
appealing biological weapon due to its high lethality and
the ease of production and dissemination [1,2]. B. anthra-
cis  is a Gram-positive, aerobic, facultatively anaerobic,
rod-shaped bacterium 1–1.5 µm wide and 3–10 µm long.
An important aspect of B. anthracis is its ability to form
dormant spores. Anthrax spores are naturally present in
soil throughout the world, can remain viable for decades,
and are highly resistant to adverse conditions such as heat,
drought, ultraviolet light, gamma irradiation, and many
disinfectants [3]. Anthrax spores are about 1–2 µm in
diameter, optimal for inhalation and deposition in the
alveolar spaces [4]. Inhalation of spores is almost always
fatal, even with aggressive antimicrobial therapy [5].
Robust enough to withstand bomb detonation and small
enough to aerosolize, anthrax spores may be easily dis-
persed over large populations by missiles, bombs, and
aerosolization from flying aircraft. An aerosol release of
odorless, invisible anthrax spores could travel far down-
wind from the point of release and cause catastrophic loss
of life.
Natural cases of human inhalational anthrax infection are
rare in recent history. In the century preceding the anthrax
attack in 2001, only 18 cases of inhalational anthrax were
reported in the U.S., with the most recent one in 1976.
However, several lethal anthrax attacks have been docu-
mented. In 1979, anthrax spores were accidentally
released from a military laboratory in the former Soviet
city of Sverdlovsk. Sixty-four people were reported dead,
although U.S. intelligence sources claimed the toll might
have reached 1,000 [1]. In 2001, through deliberate deliv-
ery of anthrax spores in mailed letters, 10 confirmed cases
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of inhalational anthrax and 12 confirmed or suspected
cases of cutaneous anthrax in humans were reported in
the U.S. [6]. If handled less competently, this attack could
have killed many more people. For example, the letter
sent to Senator Daschle reportedly contained 2 g of B.
anthracis powder, equivalent to 200 billion to 2 trillion
spores [2]. The human LD50 (dose sufficient to kill 50% of
infected persons) is estimated to be 2,500 to 55,000
inhaled spores, and as few as 1 to 3 spores may be suffi-
cient to cause infection. Hence, an envelope full of
anthrax spores, properly distributed, could kill many
people.
Disease and treatment
Anthrax can affect a wide variety of wild and domestic ani-
mals as well as humans [7]. Humans may become
infected by anthrax spores through skin abrasions, inges-
tion, or inhalation [6]. Cutaneous anthrax is mild and can
be treated with antibiotics. Gastrointestinal or inhala-
tional anthrax, if left untreated, usually leads to fatal sys-
temic disease with a mortality rate approaching 100
percent [6]. Inhalational anthrax is the most lethal form.
When anthrax spores are inhaled, they are deposited in
alveolar spaces and ingested as inert particles by local
macrophages [4,5]. The spores are then transported by the
infected macrophages to mediastinal and peribronchial
lymph nodes, where they germinate into vegetative
bacilli. The bacilli escape from the macrophages and
begin unimpeded extracellular multiplication within the
lymphatic system, causing regional hemorrhagic lym-
phadenitis. The bacilli then spread into the bloodstream
and continue rapid replication, reaching as many as 109
organisms per milliliter of blood [8]. All the while, the
bacilli secrete high levels of exotoxins that intoxicate the
host. The initial symptoms, such as malaise, fatigue, and
cough, are nondescript and resemble those of influenza
and other common upper respiratory infections, which
makes early specific diagnosis difficult. After 2 to 5 days,
there is a sudden onset of acute symptoms, which may
include fever, chills, subcutaneous edema of the cheek
and neck, widening of the mediastinum and pleural effu-
sions, and hemorrhagic meningitis [4,5]. Death usually
occurs within 24 hrs due to respiratory failure, with over-
whelming bacteremia often associated with meningitis
and subarachnoid hemorrhage [9].
Theoretically, there are several ways to approach anthrax:
(i) vaccination to prevent disease development, (ii) elim-
ination of spores, (iii) antibiotics to kill vegetative bacilli
before the disease reaches a systemic stage, and (iv) con-
junctive antitoxin therapy against anthrax toxin. Cur-
rently, treatment for anthrax relies mainly on antibiotics.
A combination of antibiotics and aggressive hospital sup-
portive care may succeed in the prodromal stage, but
because the bacteria produce massive amounts of toxins
that rapidly flood the blood and lymph system and send
the patient into shock, the disease is often beyond treat-
ment and inevitably fatal once the symptomatic stage has
been reached [4,10]. Antitoxin therapy is also attractive,
but if the bacteria continue to grow, will not be sufficient
to stop anthrax. Full recovery from anthrax requires timely
administration of antibiotics and antitoxic remedies, but
timing is difficult due to non-specific initial symptoms.
Hence, a prophylactic vaccine that prevents infection or
stops infection at an early stage would be highly desirable.
Vaccine against spores?
Critical steps in B. anthracis infection include spore entry
and germination, bacillar multiplication and dissemina-
tion, and toxin production. Destroying the spores either
before or after they enter host cells is an attractive strategy
to prevent disease development. However, such an
approach aimed either at control or treatment has thus far
not been developed. This is partially due to our almost
complete lack of molecular understanding of anthrax
spores and the inability of our immune system to disable
anthrax spores. Our knowledge about spores is essentially
limited to descriptive electron-microscopic morphology
dating back mostly to the 1960s. The anthrax spore con-
sists of several morphologically distinct layers, from out-
side to inside: exosporium, spore coat, cortex, spore
membrane, and core [11]. These structures jointly provide
a highly protective "lockbox", protecting the core which
houses the spore's genetic material [12]. Because of this
robust architecture, anthrax spores are long-lived and
extremely resistant to adverse environments. Once inside
the host, the same structures allow anthrax spores to sur-
vive the host immune defense and to germinate.
It is not clear which type of immune response will be
effective against spores. On the humoral immunity side,
one could develop vaccines that elicit specific antibodies
to opsonize spores. Several spore surface proteins have
been identified recently [13-16]. However, since ingested,
un-opsonized spores germinate in and are not killed by
macrophages, would opsonized spores be taken up by
macrophages or other phagocytes and be killed [17]?
Would complement be able to lyse the spores? On the cel-
lular immunity side, could cytotoxic T cells destroy the
dormant or germinating spores inside macrophages? Con-
sequently, whether a conventional vaccine design with the
goal of eliciting antibodies or T cell immunity would be
effective against spores is still an open question. By con-
trast, development of vaccines targeting the anthrax exo-
toxin and extracellular bacilli has been much more
promising.Medical Immunology 2005, 4:4 http://www.medimmunol.com/content/4/1/4
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Two major virulence factors
The virulence of B. anthracis is attributable to two major
factors: a poly-γ -D-glutamic acid (PGA) capsule and a
secreted tripartite protein complex toxin. Fully virulent
strains of B. anthracis carry two large extrachromosomal
plasmids, pXO1 and pXO2, which encode for the toxin
and the PGA capsule [18,19], respectively. Absence of
either plasmid results in a marked reduction in virulence
[7,20].
The first description of the B. anthracis capsule dates back
to 1903 and M'Fadyean's discovery of the relationship
between in vivo formation of the capsule and virulence
[21]. The importance of the capsule was further empha-
sized in the 1950s when Bail demonstrated that strains
that had lost the ability to produce a capsule were aviru-
lent [7]. Wild-type anthrax bacillus is capsulated in ani-
mal hosts, but not in culture unless suitable conditions
are provided [7]. Factors that influence capsule formation
are important for determining the outcome of infection.
In susceptible animals, the bacilli remain encapsulated,
whereas in resistant animals, the capsule is shed [22]. PGA
is an anionic, poorly immunogenic polypeptide that dis-
guises the bacteria from the host immune surveillance
and, by virtue of its negative charges, inhibits bactericidal
activity by the host [7]. Thus, the PGA capsule allows vir-
ulent anthrax bacilli to grow virtually unimpeded in the
infected host.
Anthrax toxin, the other major virulence factor of B.
anthracis, was discovered in 1954, when Smith and Keppie
demonstrated that sterile plasma from experimentally
infected guinea pigs was lethal when injected into other
animals [8,23]. Anthrax toxin includes lethal toxin and
edema toxin, which are binary complexes formed, respec-
tively, by lethal factor (LF) and edema factor (EF) with
protective antigen (PA) [24,25]. These proteins are
released discretely as nontoxic monomers. The character-
istic edema observed in cutaneous anthrax is produced by
edema toxin [10,22]. EF is a calmodulin-dependent ade-
nylate cyclase and catalyzes the production of intracellular
cyclic AMP from host ATP [26]. Increased cellular levels of
cyclic AMP upset water homeostasis and can cause mas-
sive edema. The most severe symptoms of anthrax, such as
hypotension, shock, and death, are caused by lethal toxin
[10,22]. LF is a zinc metalloprotease that inactivates
mitogen-activated protein kinase kinase and acts specifi-
cally on macrophages [27-29]. Lethal toxin, when given
intravenously, is relatively weak compared with other bac-
terial toxins [9]. Both lethal and edema toxins are thought
to be important in the establishment of disease by impair-
ing the host defenses.
Overall, the capsule and toxin act jointly to maximize the
survival of bacilli in the host. While the PGA capsule pas-
sively protects the bacilli from host defense, the toxin
actively impairs the host to further ensure a favorable
environment for bacillar growth.
Veterinary vaccine: live attenuated organisms
Studies on the vaccination of animals against anthrax date
back to the end of the 19th century. In the 1870s, Robert
Koch established B. anthracis as the etiologic agent of
anthrax. In 1881, Pasteur demonstrated protective immu-
nization against anthrax using a heat-attenuated strain,
which was later recognized as an encapsulated strain with
reduced virulence [7,21,30]. In the 1930s, Sterne devel-
oped an attenuated, toxigenic, but non-encapsulated
strain that proved to be remarkably effective as a vaccine
for domestic animals and is now used worldwide [7].
Although effective, the attenuated spore vaccines devel-
oped by Pasteur and Sterne suffer from declining potency
and troublesome variations in virulence that led occasion-
ally to the death of animals [21,30]. Due to residual viru-
lence, the attenuated spore vaccines are not used in
humans.
Existing human vaccine: crude preparation of PA
The development of anthrax vaccines for human use
began in the 1940s, motivated by fear of the use of
anthrax as a biological weapon. In 1970, the protective
antigen (PA)-based cell-free subunit vaccine, designated
"anthrax vaccine adsorbed" (AVA) or Biothrax, was
licensed and recommended for use by a small population
of mill workers, veterinarians, laboratory scientists, and
others with risk of occupational exposure to anthrax
[30,31]. Increased concern about the use of anthrax in
warfare led the Department of Defense to vaccinate U.S.
military personnel in the 1990s. 
AVA is prepared from microaerophilic cultures of the
attenuated, non-encapsulated strain V770-NP1-R of B.
anthracis [9,31]. Downstream processing begins with fil-
tration, which removes the bacterial cells along with some
EF and LF. The cell-free culture filtrate, thought to contain
predominantly PA, is then adsorbed to aluminum
hydroxide [32]. Small amounts of formaldehyde and ben-
zethonium chloride are added as preservatives [9].
Although PA is by itself an effective immunogen, it is not
clear whether the small amounts of LF and EF that may be
present in some lots contribute to the vaccine's effective-
ness. A vaccine licensed in the UK is prepared by alum pre-
cipitation of the sterile culture filtrate of a derivative of the
attenuated Sterne strain. It contains higher amounts of LF
and EF than AVA [33,34].
The efficacy of AVA and highly purified PA preparations
have been tested in various animal models, including
mice, hamsters, guinea pigs, rabbits, and monkeys
[31,32,35]. Interestingly, protection varies widely amongMedical Immunology 2005, 4:4 http://www.medimmunol.com/content/4/1/4
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species. AVA does not protect hamsters at all [36]. In mice,
the PGA capsule appears to be the primary virulence fac-
tor, and PA-based vaccines confer only limited protection
[37]. There is no direct correlation between anti-PA titers
and protection in mice and hamsters [36,37]. In guinea
pigs, AVA provides partial protection [35,38,39], but AVA
appears to be more effective in rabbit and macaque mod-
els [35,40-42]. It is noteworthy that "efficacy", as defined
in these studies, is relative. When macaques were exposed
experimentally to doses of up to 900 times the LD50, 88–
100% of the animals were protected [31]. However, sim-
ulation studies suggest that a person opening a letter filled
with anthrax spores and standing over it for 10 min could
inhale up to 3,000 times and perhaps as much as 9,000
times the LD50 for humans [2].
A controlled human trial was conducted in the 1950s with
a vaccine similar to AVA but derived from a different
attenuated, non-encapsulated strain of B. anthracis grown
aerobically. In a susceptible population of textile mill
workers in the northeastern states of the US who proc-
essed occasionally contaminated goat hair, vaccination
provided 92.5% protection against cutaneous anthrax
[43,44]. However, no assessment of inhalational anthrax
could be made, because cases were too few.
There are several concerns regarding AVA: (i) It does not
protect all animal hosts against different strains of B.
anthracis. AVA or PA-based vaccines in general induce
toxin-neutralizing antibodies. The mechanism underlying
the protective action of PA-based vaccines is unclear. It is
thought that anti-PA vaccines protect the host from intox-
ication and thus allow the immune system to deal with
the organism. However, evidence that primates vaccinated
with AVA or PA vaccine develop transient episodes of bac-
teremia suggests that vaccination does not prevent the
growth of bacilli. (ii) The administration of AVA is bur-
densome, requiring subcutaneous injections at 0, 2, and 4
weeks and 6, 12, and 18 months with subsequent yearly
boosters [31,32]. In a field trial of a vaccine similar to
AVA, one case of cutaneous anthrax occurred 5 months
after the initial 3-dose series and just before the scheduled
6-month booster [9]. This case suggests that immunity is
not long-lasting and that frequent boosters may be neces-
sary. (iii) The preparative processing of AVA is crude and
lacks consistency. Furthermore, there are relatively high
rates of local and systemic adverse reactions, likely due to
residual toxicity in AVA or other contaminants.
Improvement: highly purified recombinant PA
The limitations of AVA have raised widespread interest in
developing improved anthrax vaccines consisting of well-
characterized components. A new generation of vaccines
based on highly purified recombinant PA is currently
being developed and evaluated. There have been numer-
ous attempts to establish high-level PA expression systems
based on a variety of organisms, including attenuated
strains of B. anthracis, B. subtilis, B. brevis, Salmonella typh-
imurium, E. coli, viruses, insect cells, and plants [45-50]. In
addition, genetic immunization with DNA encoding for
PA is being explored [51].
The highly purified PA vaccines are expected to induce
essentially the same immunity as AVA. While some disad-
vantages of AVA due to its "dirty" preparation may be
overcome, limitations in protection and lack of an
immune memory response may be intrinsic to PA itself.
New strategies are needed for further improvement. One
possibility is that other antigens or cellular immunity in
addition to PA-specific antibodies are required for full
protection in different animal species. This is supported
by studies showing that the live veterinary vaccine pro-
vides significantly greater protection against anthrax in
experimental animals than does AVA, despite the fact that
it frequently induces lower levels of antibodies to PA
[33,39,42,52,53]. After a naturally acquired infection, and
depending on when samples are taken, 68–93% of cases
develop antibodies to PA, 42–55% of cases develop anti-
bodies to LF, and antibodies to EF are less frequently
detected [34,54-56]. Interestingly, antibodies to the cap-
sule are detected in 67–94% cases [55,56], whereas no
response to the capsule is expected in the vaccinees who
have been vaccinated with AVA or non-encapsulated live
vaccines.
Further improvement: two-in-one postexposure 
antitoxic therapy/vaccine
Post-exposure vaccination is the most likely scenario,
given the rarity of natural inhalational anthrax infection.
However, the use of PA as a postexposure vaccine may be
limited. Since PA is a natural component of anthrax toxin
and may contribute to toxin formation, it may not be safe
to administer a PA-based vaccine to persons who have
been or are suspected of having been exposed to anthrax.
We recently proposed the replacement of PA in vaccines
with a dominant-negative inhibitor (DNI) of anthrax
toxin [57]. DNI is a translocation-deficient mutant of PA
carrying double mutations of K397D and D425K and has
been demonstrated to interfere with the intoxication proc-
ess, providing immediate therapeutic protection against
anthrax toxin in vivo [58,59]. Furthermore, when used as
a vaccine, DNI is more immunogenic than PA [57].
The symptoms and incubation period of human anthrax
vary depending on the route of transmission. The reported
incubation period of inhalational anthrax, the most lethal
form, ranges from 1 to 43 days [60]. Data from animal
studies suggest that anthrax spores persist in the host for
several weeks after infection and that antibiotics canMedical Immunology 2005, 4:4 http://www.medimmunol.com/content/4/1/4
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prolong the incubation period for developing disease.
Studies in nonhuman primates indicate that inhaled
spores do not immediately germinate within the alveolar
recesses but reside there, possibly for weeks, until taken
up by alveolar macrophages [61]. Development of
anthrax disease can be prevented as long as a therapeutic
level of antibiotic is maintained to kill germinating bacilli.
After antibiotics are discontinued, disease will develop if
the remaining spores germinate in the absence of a protec-
tive immune response. In previous animal studies, treat-
ment with antibiotics for 5 or 10 days, beginning one day
after anthrax spore aerosol challenge, was protective dur-
ing drug therapy, but animals died after the antibiotic was
discontinued [61]. Longer antibiotic treatment, e.g., for
30 days, might be necessary to ensure full recovery. How-
ever, antibiotic treatment cannot protect against relapse or
subsequent exposure to anthrax. Long-term protection
was achieved only by combining antibiotic therapy with
post-exposure vaccination [62]. In such situations, con-
junctive antibiotic treatment and vaccination with DNI
would be ideal, whereas administration of PA would be
potentially dangerous because it may combine with trace
amounts of LF or EF and cause toxicity.
During the anthrax attack in the U.S. in 2001, some
groups of individuals underwent a 60-day regimen of
antibiotic prophylaxis. Statistical analysis shows that this
preventative measure may have saved many lives [63]. In
the event of an anthrax attack, the incubation period will
vary among individuals. The timely post-exposure admin-
istration of DNI as both a conjunctive therapy to antibiot-
ics and a prophylactic vaccine would be expected to be
superior, both for individual and public health
perspectives.
Enhanced antigen processing through 
"endosomal trapping"?
The increased immunogenicity of DNI not only recom-
mends it as a potential new anthrax vaccine but may also
point to a potentially important general strategy for future
vaccine design. We proposed an "endosomal trapping"
mechanism that rationalizes more efficient antigen
processing of DNI over native PA [57]. As illustrated in
Figure 1, PA molecules undergo several transformations
during the intoxication process [24]. Upon release, the 83-
kD PA molecule first binds to a receptor present on most
mammalian cells [25,64-66]. The cell-bound PA is then
cleaved by furin or a furin-like protease into two compo-
nents [67]. The dissociation of the N-terminal 20-kDa
fragment PA20 exposes a binding site for LF or EF to the
cell-bound 63-kDa fragment PA63 and also enables PA63 to
assemble into a heptameric, ring-shaped prepore (PA63)7
[68]. LF or EF bind competitively to (PA63)7 with very high
affinity (Kd ~ 1 nM) [69,70]. The complex is internalized
by receptor-mediated endocytosis and trafficked into an
acidic endosomal compartment. (PA63)7  undergoes a
major conformational rearrangement following the pH
change and forms a membrane-spanning β  barrel that
enables its penetration into the cytosol [71,72]. By means
of (PA63)7, EF and LF translocate into the cytosol, where
they modify substrates and exert toxic effect (see above).
However, the two mutations in DNI inhibit the required
conformational change of (DNI63)7 or chimeric DNI/PA
heptamers from a ring-shaped core to a β  barrel and thus
prevent the heptamer from inserting into the endosomal
membrane [59]. Consequently, these mutations inhibit
the translocation of LF or EF into the cytosol and prevent
cytotoxicity [58].
Protein antigens are commonly processed in the endo-
somes of antigen-presenting cells and elicit T-cell help in
antibody production. The peptides from degraded protein
antigens are loaded onto MHC class II molecules and
transported to the cell surface. Thus, the insertion of PA
pores in the endosomal membrane may disrupt the integ-
rity of the endosome and thus compromise its function,
perhaps leading to altered vesicular trafficking of endo-
cytic PA molecules. Altered vesicular trafficking of PA may
affect its delivery to specialized endosomal compart-
ments, where antigenic processing of PA occurs. It is also
possible that PA pore formation might simply change the
pH or ionic environment inside the lumen of the endo-
some and thus affect the processing/presentation machin-
ery. Furthermore, PA may disrupt or otherwise "leak" out
of the endosome and simply enter the cytosol (as is the
case for the LF and EF subunits) and thus escape efficient
endosomal processing. In contrast, DNI heptamers do not
insert into the endosomal membrane and block transloca-
tion of LF and EF into the cytosol. Thus, DNI is expected
to be trapped in the endosome and undergo normal vesic-
ular trafficking. Hence, the translocation-deficient mutant
DNI may concentrate in the endosome; that is, DNI may
be more prone to "endosomal trapping" than PA, and this
difference in localization may increase the generation of
processed DNI peptides suitable for binding to MHC class
II molecules. If such a mechanism indeed explains the
enhanced immunogenicity of DNI, similar strategic muta-
tions might be introduced into other toxin immunogens
to enhance their immunogenicity via this "endosomal
trapping" mechanism.
New-generation vaccines: dual protection 
against bacilli and toxin
Despite the direct toxicity of anthrax toxin, systemic
anthrax disease is amplified by the massive extracellular
replication of the bacilli that produce it. Directly targeting
B. anthracis at the extracellular stage is both appealing and
feasible. It should be reiterated that it is the bacilli that are
replicating and secreting toxins, and eliminating bacilli
would abrogate toxin production at the source. A majorMedical Immunology 2005, 4:4 http://www.medimmunol.com/content/4/1/4
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virulence factor of B. anthracis is its anti-phagocytic PGA
capsule [7,73]. The role of a capsule in virulence has been
well established for numerous bacterial species, such as
Streptococcus pneumoniae and type b Haemophilus influenzae
(Hib) [74,75]. In these bacteria, the capsule also confers
resistance to phagocytosis by host cells. The immunologi-
cal role of the B. anthracis PGA capsule very much resem-
bles the role of capsular polysaccharides in other bacteria.
The weakly immunogenic capsules do not favor an
immune response but rather enable encapsulated bacteria
to evade the host immune defenses. Vaccines based on
capsular polysaccharides have been highly successful
against pathogens such as Hib. We hypothesized that
PGA-based vaccines could have similar success in protec-
tion against B. anthracis infection.
Although capsular PGA is a promising antigen for a new
anthrax vaccine, PGA alone has limited use because of its
weak immunogenicity. Fortunately, similar to polysaccha-
rides, the immunogenicity of PGA can be significantly
enhanced by conjugation to a strongly immunogenic pro-
tein carrier [76,77]. Functional studies have demonstrated
that anti-PGA antibodies do indeed confer protection by
mediating opsonophagocytosis of B. anthracis [78,79].
Because the pathogenesis of anthrax is largely attributable
to replication of bacilli and release of toxin, we con-
structed a new generation of anthrax vaccines by chemi-
cally conjugating PGA and PA, the two virulence
components of B. anthracis. This dually active anthrax vac-
cine (DAAV) is capable of inducing high levels of specific
antibodies to both capsule and toxin [76]. We envision
that a PGA-directed antibody response will achieve pro-
tection against anthrax by eliminating bacteria early in the
sequence of infection, well before the onset of bacteremia
and toxemia. The fact that the very early stages of anthrax
disease can be treated by antibiotics also supports the
notion that an anti-bacillar vaccine may be effective, or at
least a valuable addition to vaccines based on PA alone. In
addition, antibodies to PA provide a parallel line of
defense against residual toxin. DAAVs embody the para-
digm of combining both antibacterial (i.e., prophylactic)
and antitoxic (i.e., therapeutic) components into a single
vaccine.
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Models illustrating the different cellular fates of PA and DNI Figure 1
Models illustrating the different cellular fates of PA and DNI. 
Top: Upon binding cellular receptors (step 1), PA is cleaved 
(step 2). The small fragments diffuse away, and the cell-bound 
fraction self-assembles into heptameric cores termed (PA63)7 
(step 3). The heptamers then undergo receptor-mediated 
endocytosis (step 4). Once inside the acidic endosomal com-
partment, the PA heptamers change conformation and insert 
into the endosomal membrane (step 5). Bottom: DNI, similar 
to PA, enters the endosome (steps 1–4). However, DNI hep-
tamers do not undergo the necessary conformational 
changes for insertion into the membrane and therefore 
remain trapped inside the endosome.
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